

















































































Variable	 N	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min	 Max	Number	of	outposts	 264	 4.8	 6.0	 0	 24	Private	Palestinian	land	in	outposts	(in	square	meters)	 264	 244,830	 472,202	 0	 2,159,010	Attempted	suicide	attacks	 264	 0.5	 1.1	 0	 8	%	district-quarters	with	successful	suicide	attacks	 264	 20%	 40	 0%	 100%	Attempted	attacks	in	the	WB	 264	 1.9	 3.5	 0	 25	%	district-quarters	with	successful	attacks	in	the	WB	 264	 30%	 40	 0%	 100%	Settler	population	 264	 19,839	 18,331	 9900	 61,613	%	Secular	settlers	 264	 26.1% 22.4	 1.3%	 75.2%	%	Religious-nationalistic	settlers	 264	 33.7%	 24.6	 0%	 78.9%	%	Orthodox	settlers	 264	 11.2%	 20.8	 0%	 62.5%	Palestinian	population	 264	 188,213	 133,205	 34,188	 507,611	Palestinian	unemployment	rate	 264	 21.5%	 7.9	 7.3%	 45.1%	










Diff	Outposts	 11	(1.11)	 6.4	(0.72)	 4.6***	(1.75)	 0.00	Private	Palestinian	land	in	outposts	(square	meters)	 693,065	(127,623)	 342,710	(61,378)	 350,355**	(172,785)	 0.02	Settler	population	 10,902	(3.91)	 16,008	(2.28)	 -5,107	(5.58)	 0.18	Secular	settler	population	 14.5%	(5.80)	 24.3%	(2.89)	 -9.7%	(7.18)	 0.09	%Nationalistic-religious	settlers	 48.2%	(5.93)	 35.8%	(3.63)	 12.4%	(8.84)	 0.09	%Orthodox-religious	settlers	 5.1%	(4.71)	 11.5%	(2.89)	 -6.4%	(7.05)	 0.18	Palestinian	population	 303,860	(24.53)	 230,208	(15.52)	 73,652**	(37.71)	 0.03	Palestinian	unemployment	rate	 24%	(2.57)	 26.2%	(0.99)	 -2.2%	(2.55)	 0.19	N	 10	 54	 	 	












Outposts	 5.7	(0.76)	 6.8	(0.80)	 1.1	(1.10)	 0.17	Private	Palestinian	land	in	outposts	(square	meters)	 295,453	(62,311)	 394,797	(74,645)	 -99,344	(96,580)	 0.15	Settler	population	 21,970	(2.08)	 19,886	(2.26)	 2,084	(3.07)	 0.25	Secular	settler	population	 22.8%	(2.55)	 22.0%	(2.56)	 0.8%	(3.63)	 0.41	%Nationalistic-religious	settlers	 31.8%	(2.74)	 35.7%	(2.71)	 -3.9%	(3.88)	 0.15	%Orthodox-religious	settlers	 14.1%	(2.70)	 14.1%	(2.27)	 0.0%	(3.87)	 0.49	Palestinian	population	 189,166	(14.50)	 241,821	(17.19)	 52,655***	(22.32)	 0.01	Palestinian	unemployment	rate	 23.2%	(0.88)	 23.7%	(1.05)	 -0.5%	(1.36)	 0.37	N	 75	 65	 	 	
Note:	This	panel	compares	the	means	of	district-quarters	in	which	failed	and	successful	attacks	against	Israelis	in	the	WB	took	place	(standard	deviations	are	in	parentheses).	p-values	are	from	one-sided	t-tests.	***	Difference	of	means	is	statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level.		 Table	3:	Comparison	of	district-quarters	with	failed	and	successful	attacks	against	Israeli	civilian	and	mixed	targets.		 	
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Variable	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	Successt-1	 0.547***	(0.185)	 0.852***	(0.244)	 0.390**	(0.159)	 0.528**	(0.221)	ΔSettler		populationt	 	 	 0.03	(0.100)	 -0.486	(0.300)	%ΔSecular	settlerst	 	 	 -0.031	(0.045)	 0.380	(0.371)	%ΔReligious-nationalistic	settlerst	 	 	 -0.046	(0.057)	 -0.155	(0.364)	%ΔOrthodox	settlerst	 	 	 0.469**	(0.176)	 0.939**	(0.379)	ΔPalestinian	populationt	 	 	 0.067***	(0.009)	 0.152***	(0.029)	ΔPalestinian	unemploymentt	 	 	 0.056*	(0.026)	 0.134**	(0.045)	Intercept	 0.305	(0.141)	 	 0.103	(0.056)	 -0.098	(0.061)	R2	 0.04	 0.05	 0.30	 0.50	F	test	 8.72	 12.21	 50.46	 54.67	N	 264	 64	 264	 64	
Note:	OLS	regression	of	the	change	in	the	number	of	outposts	between	t-1	and	t+1	in	suicide	bombers’	districts	on	attack	outcome	in	quarter	t	(success	indicator).	Columns	(1)	and	(3)	present	results	using	all	districts	(comparing	the	effect	of	successful	attacks	to	fails	and	no	attacks).	Columns	(2)	and	(4)	use	only	districts-quarters	with	attempted	attacks,	and	compare	success	to	failure	conditional	on	an	attack.	Standard	errors	and	p-values	are	computed	using	robust	standard	errors	clustered	at	district	level.	The	shaded	row	highlights	the	variable	of	interest.		*p<0.1,	**p<0.05,	***p<0.01		 Table	4:	Suicide	attacks	and	outposts’	expansion	in	attackers’	home	districts		 	
	 32	
Variable	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	Successt-1	 0.998***	(0.258)	 0.849***	(0.242)	 0.791***	(0.188)	 0.704***	(0.189)	ΔSettler		populationt	 	 	 -0.011	(0.084)	 -0.061	(0.122)	%ΔSecular	settlerst	 	 	 0.031	(0.048)	 0.051	(0.098)	%ΔReligious-nationalistic	settlerst	 	 	 -0.039	(0.053)	 -0.096	(0.153)	%ΔOrthodox	settlerst	 	 	 0.489**	(0.164)	 0.715**	(0.263)	ΔPalestinian	populationt	 	 	 0.057***	(0.010)	 0.072***	(0.015)	ΔPalestinian	unemploymentt	 	 	 0.048*	(0.023)	 0.053*	(0.027)	Intercept	 0.171**	(0.061)	 0.320***	(0.101)	 0.018	(0.046)	 0.058	(0.099)	R2	 0.17	 0.10	 0.38	 0.39	F	test	 14.96	 12.36	 69.02	 98.66	N	 264	 140	 264	 140	
Note:	OLS	regression	of	the	change	in	the	number	of	outposts	between	t-1	and	t+1	in	WB	districts	where	attacks	take	place	in	quarter	t	(success	indicator).	Columns	(1)	and	(3)	present	results	using	all	districts	(comparing	the	effect	of	successful	attacks	to	fails	and	no	attacks).	Columns	(2)	and	(4)	use	only	districts-quarters	with	attempted	attacks,	and	compare	success	to	failure	conditional	on	an	attack.	Standard	errors	and	p-values	are	computed	using	robust	standard	errors	clustered	at	district	level.	The	shaded	row	highlights	the	variable	of	interest.		*p<0.1,	**p<0.05,	***p<0.01		 Table	5:	Suicide	attacks	and	outposts’	expansion	in	districts	where	attacks	take	place		 	
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Variable	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	Successt-1	 2.120**	(0.800)	 3.408**	(1.270)	 3.512***	(0.766)	 2.777***	(0.696)	ΔSettler		populationt	 -0.263		(0.428)	 -3.400**	(1.167)	 -0.363	(0.362)	 -0.520	(0.557)	%ΔSecular	settlerst	 0.060	(0.326)	 1.744	(1.763)	 0.091	(0.315)	 0.285	(0.478)	%ΔReligious-nationalistic	settlerst	 0.168		(0.367)	 -0.295	(1.527)	 0.194	(0.335)	 0.324	(0.766)	%ΔOrthodox	settlerst	 2.067**		(0.681)	 4.523*	(2.040)	 2.170***	(0.623)	 3.027**	(1.002)	ΔPalestinian	populationt	 0.170**	(0.057)	 0.481***	(0.150)	 0.145	(0.083)	 0.186	(0.109)	ΔPalestinian	unemploymentt	 0.142*	(0.075)	 0.468**	(0.150)	 0.110	(0.065)	 0.126	(0.071)	Intercept	 0.872*	(0.395)	 0.021	(0.361)	 0.549*	(0.295)	 1.136	(0.681)	R2	 0.19	 0.38	 0.27	 0.26	F	test	 11.21	 36.20	 7.47	 16.83	N	 243	 57	 243	 132	
Note:	OLS	regression	of	the	change	in	the	area	of	Private	Palestinian	land	seized	for	outposts	between	t-1	and	t+1	in	WB	districts.	Only	results	with	control	variables	are	presented	for	brevity	purposes.	Columns	(1)	and	(2)	present	the	effect	of	successful	suicide	attacks	on	outposts’	expansion	in	the	perpetrators’	districts	of	origin.	Columns	(3)	and	(4)	show	the	effect	of	fatal	attacks	in	the	WB	on	outposts	growth	in	districts	where	these	attacks	take	place.	Columns	(1)	and	(3)	use	all	districts,	and	columns	(2)	and	(4)	only	districts	from	which	or	in	which	attacks	were	attempted.	Standard	errors	and	p-values	are	computed	using	robust	standard	errors	clustered	at	district	level.	The	shaded	row	highlights	the	variable	of	interest.		*p<0.1,	**p<0.05,	***p<0.01		Table	6:	Outposts	expansion	measured	in	square	meters	on	Private	Palestinian	land	used	for	outposts		 	
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Variable	 Negative	binomial	model	 OLS	with	lagged	DV	(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	Suicide	attack	successt-1	 1.040	(0.038)	 	 0.281**	(0.097)	 	WB	attack	successt-1	 	 1.10*	(0.058)	 	 0.200	(0.118)	Intercept	 0.011**	(0.006)	 0.007***	(0.005)	 -0.795	(0.875)	 -0.134	(0.590)	Controls	 yes	 yes	 yes	 yes	R2	 0.47	 0.49	 0.99	 0.99	N	 61	 135	 61	 135	
Note:	Model	1	reports	the	results	of	a	negative	binomial	regression	of	the	number	of	outposts	in	district	i	on	a	binary	indicator	(lag)	of	a	successful	suicide	attacks	coming	from	district	i.	Model	2	reports	the	same	model,	only	this	time	the	number	of	outposts	in	district	i		is	regressed	on	a	binary	indicator	(lag)	of	fatal	attacks	in	district	i.	The	coefficients	are	reported	in	terms	of	incidence	rate	ratios	(IRR).	Models	3	and	4	report	the	same	models,	only	this	time	using	an	OLS	with	lagged	dependent	variable	instead	of	the	negative	binomial	model.	All	models	include	controls.	The	sample	is	limited	to	districts	with	attempted	attacks.	Robust	standard	errors	clustered	at	district	levels	are	in	parentheses.		*p<0.1,	**p<0.05,	***p<0.01		 Table	7:	Robustness	checks.												
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